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Ethnic minorities may be attached to a specific territory to a smaller or 
greater degree. At one extreme we find autochthonous groups whose very 
definition depends on such an attachment. (The word autochthonous is 
derived from the Greek and literally means ‘sprung from the land itself’.) At 
the other extreme we find diasporas. Also a Greek word, diaspora literally 
means ‘spread out’ or ‘dispersed’. It indicates that the group in question has 
left its original homeland and dispersed to all points of the compass. In an 
influential article from 1976 John Armstrong defined a diaspora as ‘any 
ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity’.2 
 
For the purposes of this article the expressions ‘attachment to a specific 
territory’ and ‘territoriality’ will be used interchangeably. It is argued that in 
many parts of the world the degree of territoriality of various ethnic groups 
in a given polity is a politically highly charged question: the ‘sons of the 
soil’ are regarded as entitled to more rights than are newcomers. Groups 
with a high degree of territorial attachment are also regarded as more loyal 
than ‘birds-of-passage’ groups.  
 
By calling diasporas ‘groups’ I do not mean to say that they necessarily 
display a high degree of collective identity or ‘groupness’. Many individuals 
of whom one might expect an adherence to a given diaspora community by 
dint of their ethnic extraction or official passport registration, may instead 
choose to identify with the majority population in their country of residence, 
or opt out of the diaspora community for some other reason. Identities are 
malleable and fluid, and a high number of possible identity trajectories for 
diaspora members may be identified.3 For the purposes of the present article 
                                           
1 I would like to thank David Laitin and Millennium’s reviewers for insightful comments to the draft 
version of this article.  
2 John A. Armstrong, ‘Mobilized and Proletarian Diasporas’, The American Political Science Review 70 
(1976), 393--408, p. 393.  
3 Pål Kolstø, ‘The new Russian diaspora - an identity of its own? Possible identity trajectories for Russians 
in the former Soviet republic’, Ethnic and Racial studies 19, no. 3, (1996), 609--639.  
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I will bracket this aspect of the identity issue. Instead, I will focus on fluidity 
along the spatial axis: territoriality as a fluid and malleable property. 
 
Territoriality is not a given. It is determined not only by geography, 
demography, and history, but also by such intangibles as perceptions and 
ideas. The members of a minority group may see themselves as clearly 
‘rooted’ in the land, while the members of the majority culture would be 
unwilling to accept this claim. Whereas the minority prefers to describe itself 
as ‘indigenous’, majority members will use words such as ‘migrants’, 
‘diaspora’, even ‘occupants’. Thus, the struggle for territoriality starts with a 
struggle over terminology. The party which is able to impose its own words 
and concepts on the discourse will have a clear political advantage.  
 
As I have argued elsewhere4, two dimensions of territorial attachment may be 
analytically distinguished: cultural and political. A member of a diaspora 
community may feel attached to his new -- or old -- homeland both culturally 
and politically but these two vectors may also point in different directions: An 
individual may be culturally attached to his/her ‘historical fatherland’ at the 
same time as his/her political allegiance is to his/her present country of 
residence. It should be pointed out, however, that in this respect the cultural and 
political dimensions of territoriality are not symmetrical. Cultural reorientations 
may represent a continuum of positions stretching from minimal change towards 
complete cultural re-identification with numerous intervening graduations and 
intermediate types. The political dimension, on the other hand, represents more 
of a discontinuous set of choices. While also political loyalties may be vague 
and blurred, the individual will eventually have to select one to which he desires 
to pledge his allegiance from among the political entities available to him . He 
may postpone this identity choice or hide behind a posture of ‘dual loyalty’, but 
he cannot ride two horses indefinitely. In a military conflict a soldier cannot 
fight on the side of two warring parties at the same time.  
 
Below, these general points will be illustrated by an examination of the 
Russian minority groups in the former Soviet republics after the break-up of 
the unitary Soviet state. It is argued that, from very different starting points, 
the Russian state and the political leaders in the non-Russian Soviet 
successor states, somewhat ironically, have arrived at basically the same 
conclusion: they tend to see the Russian diaspora communities in the so-
                                           
4 Ibid., 613--14. 
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called ‘near abroad’ as ‘extra-territorial’, that is, as territorially linked to 
Russia rather than to the countries in which these communities are actually 
based. However, a substantial and possibly increasing number of the Russian 
diasporians themselves have come to believe that this extra-territorial status 
is not in their own interest, and wage a political struggle to be recognised as 
locals. 
 
In the Soviet Union being ‘a Russian’ was not a neat and clear-cut category 
which could be placed alongside other national identities and recognised as 
clearly distinct from them. While the boundaries of all ethic groups no doubt 
are blurred at the edges it can be argued that, as a result of the Soviet 
nationalities policies, this was, and is, particularly the case with the regard to 
the Russians. In the Soviet Union Russification of non-Russians was both 
encouraged through the educational system and, at the same time, retarded 
through the system of ascriptive nationality entries in the passports through 
which the individual inherited the official nationality of his/her parents 
whether s/he liked it or not. Millions of Soviet citizens saw themselves, and 
were regarded by others, as both ‘Russians’ and ‘non-Russians’ at the same 
time.  
 
This ambiguity lingers on today and in post-Soviet Russia there is no 
consensus as to how Russian national identity should be defined. An 
interesting survey conducted in several Russian cities in 1994 revealed that, 
among the one thousand persons who were interviewed, 29 per cent said that 
in order to be considered as a Russian (russkii), both one’s parents needed to 
be Russian, whereas 15 per cent opined it was enough if the one parent was 
Russian. Furthermore, 6 per cent replied that only those whose passports 
proclaimed them as ‘Russian’ should be counted. On the other hand, 17 per 
cent felt that all people living in Russia should be considered ‘Russian’. And 
finally, 25 per cent opted for the purely subjective response category: A 
Russian is someone who considers himself to be Russian.5 
 
For the purposes of this article I will use the official Soviet census data as a 
benchmark for ‘Russian-ness’. Since nationality in the censuses was 
registered according to self-perception rather than according to the 
nationality entry in the passports, this definition comes close to the 
subjective definition. At the same time, there is every reason to believe that 
                                           
5 See Argumenty i fakty, 8 February,1994. 
 3
the ethnic self-awareness of most Soviet citizens was strongly influenced by 
the official nationality ascribed to them.6  
 
 
Diaspora, territory, and terminology 
The paradigmatic case of a diaspora group is of course the Jews. After their 
defeat in the second Jewish war in year 70, the Jews were no longer allowed 
to live in Palestine and were forced to settle down elsewhere. Thus, distinct 
and in time well-established Jewish communities sprang up in numerous 
distant places. However, even when these communities could claim a 
continuous existence in the same area, even the same houses, for centuries,7 
they were poorly integrated into the local society. From this unrooted quality 
of the Jewish communities sprang the myth of Ahasverus, the perennially 
wandering Jew, in European folklore, as well as the myth of the Jews as the 
‘rootless cosmopolitans’ of Stalinist propaganda.8 However, it is worth 
noting that the Stalinist campaign commenced after the establishment of the 
Jewish state of Israel in 1948. Thus, the charge was not so much that the 
Jews were completely bereft of roots, but that they had (spiritual and 
historical) roots in the wrong country.  
 
And indeed, in the modern world the idea of diaspora-ness implies not so 
much that a group is totally devoid of territoriality but that it has its 
territoriality abroad.9 In this sense the term is being used in scholarly 
literature with reference to Chinese, Armenian, Greek, and other diasporas. 
Even non-European immigrant communities in West European countries, 
such as Gastarbeitern in Germany and Switzerland, are sometimes referred 
to as diasporas.10 
 
                                           
6 See Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, ‘Estimating Russification of Ethnic Identity Among Non-
Russians in the USSR’, Demography 20, no. 4 (November 1983), 461--89.  
7 See e.g. Salman Rushdie’s description of the Jewish community in Cochin on the Malabar coast in The 
Moor’s Last Sigh (London: Vintage books, 1994), 68--120.  
8 See e.g. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1956), 125--138. 
9 It should be noted that the phenomenon of a Jewish diaspora also predates the expulsion from Palestine in 
year 70. In late antiquity the Jews began to settle in towns and cities all around the Mediterranean world. 
These communities were in the New Testament collectively referred to as the ‘diaspora’ (see John 7,35, 
Jacob 1,1, and 1 Peter 1,1.)  
10 Gabriel Scheffer, ed., Modern Diasporas in International Politics (London: Croom Helm, 1986); Robin 
Cohen, Global Diasporas. An Introduction (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); Charles King 
and Neil J. Melvin, eds., Nations Abroad. Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former 
Soviet Union (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1998). 
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In recent years, the concept of diaspora has been enlarged to include also 
ethnic groups that have not migrated to distant countries, but live in 
territories adjacent to ‘the historical homeland’. Thus, also Russians outside 
Russia, Serbs in Bosnia, and Hungarians outside modern Hungary are 
regularly referred to as diasporas.11 In these cases new diaspora groups were 
created not by people crossing borders, but by the moving of borders across 
settlements. Or, in the Soviet case, by elevating the status of internal 
administrative borders within a state to the level of international borders. 
This process left the Russians living in the non-Russian Soviet republics, in 
David Laitin’s phrase, as ‘beached diasporas’: their state withdrew leaving 
them behind.12  
 
Or was this really the case? Why should we take for granted that the 
Russians in the Soviet successor states identify more with Russia than with 
their country of residence? Or, to the extent that they do so, why should we 
expect this situation to last? Why should the diaspora Russians not gradually 
transfer their attachment and allegiances -- their territoriality -- to their place 
of residence?13 These questions are at the core of the modern Russian 
diaspora issue. 
 
The Soviet legacy 
In the Soviet Union the link between ethnicity and territoriality was strong 
and institutionalised. In 1913, the future People’s Commissar for the 
Nationalities, Joseph Stalin, wrote a treatise on Marxism and the National 
Question. Here, he presented for the first time what was later to become the 
‘Stalinist model of nationality’. A nation, Stalin explained, ‘is an historically 
formed, stable community of people, which has arisen on the basis of a 
common language, common territory, common economic life, and common 
psychological cast of mind, which is manifested in a common culture’.14 On 
the basis of this definition, Stalin has been accused of reifying the nation, by 
                                           
11 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Munir Sendich and Emil Payin, The New Russian Diaspora. Russian Minorities 
in the Former Soviet Republics (Armonk: M.E.Sharpe, 1994); Kolstø, ‘The new Russian diaspora’; M.Iu. 
Martynova, ed., Novye slavianskie diaspory (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii, 1996). 
12 David D. Laitin, Identity in Formation. The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad (Ithaca: 
Cornell University press, 1998), 29.  
13 This, in fact, is the scenario which David Laitin for his part finds most likely. Laitin, Identity in 
Formation. 
14 I.V. Stalin, ‘Marksizm i natsional’nyi vopros’, in I.V. Stalin, Sochineniia (Moscow: OGIZ, 1946), vol. 2, 
290--367, p. 296.  
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defining it in terms of objective qualities.15 He certainly does, but he was 
hardly alone in that respect. His definition simply reflected the received 
wisdom of his time and place.  
 
Of particular interest to us is Stalin’s emphasis on territoriality as an 
essential element of nationhood. This point he uses to explain why 
Americans and Englishmen do not constitute one common nation in spite of 
the fact that they speak the same language. ‘Nations are formed only on the 
basis of protracted and regular contacts as a result of a community of life 
over generations. And a protracted community of life is impossible without a 
common territory’.16 A side-effect of this definition is that it denies the Jews 
a status as a nation, but again, also on this score Stalin was hardly breaking 
new ground. Already in 1903 his mentor Vladimir Lenin had written that 
‘the Jews have ceased to be a nation, for a nation without a territory is 
unthinkable’.17 Lenin’s statement is telling not only of his ideas on 
Jewishness, but also on nationhood. From the very beginning territorial 
thinking was thoroughly ingrained in the minds of Soviet communists.  
 
Lenin had described the Russian empire as a ‘prison-house of the peoples’, 
and promised that if only the non-Russians helped him topple the autocratic 
regime he would grant them complete freedom of self-determination, up to 
and including the right to secede from the state altogether. Only territories 
can secede, not individuals, and this right presupposed the existence of 
separate, nationally defined territories for all major ethnic groups in the 
country.  
 
After the October revolution the right of secession soon turned out to be 
illusory, but the territorial thinking remained and was reflected in the very 
structure of the Soviet socialist state. The USSR was established in 1922 as a 
federation in which most of the federal units were ethnically defined. Over 
                                           
15 Laitin, Identity in Formation, 10. See also Robert J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and 
the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 102--03. 
16 Stalin, ‘Marksizm’ vol. 2, 294.  
17 Iskra, 22 October 1903, as quoted in Zvi Gitelman, ‘The Jews: A Diaspora within a Diaspora’, in 
Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, Nations Abroad, 59--78, p. 62. In the Russian empire the Jews had been 
designated not as a nation (natsiia) but as ‘allogenes’ (inorodtsy). This was a common designation for most 
Asian subjects of the tsar, but the Jews were the only major European group included in this category. At 
the same time, the tsarist authorities had in fact given the Jews a kind of quasi-territoriality, or enforced 
territoriality, by imposing upon them the so-called Pale of Settlement (Cherta osedlosti). The Pale covered 
most of the westernmost parts of the empire, and the Jews were forbidden to leave it permanently without 
permission. Established in the eighteenth century the Pale was abolished only in 1917. 
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the first decades of its existence the federal structure was constantly tinkered 
with. In time it was expanded into an elaborate hierarchy with several layers 
of autonomous units. At the highest level were the Union Republics, replete 
with all the trappings of statehood, including their own flag, anthem, 
constitution, criminal code, ministries, etc. The republics were named after 
and supposed to reflect the interests and identity of the dominant ethnic 
group, the so-called ‘titular nation’.  
 
Also at lower levels -- i.e. those of the autonomous republics, autonomous 
oblasts (counties) and national (later autonomous) okrugs (districts), in 
descending order -- the units were named after and supposed to function as 
homelands for one and occasionally two ethnic groups. Often, this was 
simply a matter of tokenism. The special status of the titular group was 
reflected only in the area of language policy and even there to a very 
moderate degree: teaching in the titular language was provided for the first 
years of grade school only, a small number of books was published in this 
language, etc. Most Western observers dismissed the ethno-federal structure 
of the Soviet state as mere sham since all major (often also most minor) 
political and economic decisions were taken in Moscow.18 Some 
researchers, however, warn against regarding the Soviet ethno-federation 
a hollow shell. They point out that it gradually became filled with a certain 
amount of real content;
as 
r 
d us to expect.  
                                          
19 increasingly so as the grip of the Brezhnevite 
regime slipped in the late 1970s and early 1980s.20 In many cases the 
ethnically defined autonomous units provided the local elites of the titula
nations with the means to influence political life locally far beyond what 
their share of the total population in the area would lea 21
 
 
18 Robert Conquest, ed., The Last Empire. Nationality and the Soviet Future (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 1986); Bohdan Nahaylo and Victor Swoboda, Soviet Disunion. A History of Nationalities Problems 
in the USSR (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1990).  
 19 E.g. Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the 
Soviet Union (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Yuriy Slezkine, ‘The USSR as a Communal 
Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism’, Slavic Review 53, no. 2 (1994), 414--
452. 
20 Victor Zaslavsky, ‘The Soviet Union’, in Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen. eds., After Empire. 
Multiethnic Societies and Nation-building (Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1997), 73--96.  
21 Some observers believe that this was more typical of the Asian than the European Union republics. See 
Rasma Karklins, Ethnic Relations in the USSR. The Perspective From Below (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 
1986/1989), 77--100. 
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While the Soviet population censuses operated with more than a hundred 
ethnic groups,22 only some fifty of them had an autonomous unit of their 
own. Indeed, many ethnic groups in the USSR were so small that the 
establishment of a separate autonomy for them was out of the question, but 
importantly, also some larger groups had to do without their own homeland. 
These were the diasporas, such as the Poles, Koreans, Bulgarians, Greeks, 
etc. There seem to have been two reasons for this. In most cases these 
diaspora groups did not live on a compact territory, but were indeed 
dispersed, (and if they did have their own distinct settlements in the interwar 
period, they no longer did so after having been forcibly deported to Central 
Asia during World War II).23 The other reason was that these groups 
belonged to nations that had their own separate nation-states elsewhere: 
Poland, Korea, Bulgaria, etc., and no one could expect to have more than 
one territorial unit, could they? This was an egregious case of collectivist 
thinking: groups have rights, not individuals. The same principle was 
applied to the ‘internal Soviet diasporas’: Ukrainians living outside Ukraine 
and Tatars living outside Tataria etc. enjoyed no cultural protection or 
linguistic rights.24 
 
The other important exception to the rule that major national groups in the 
Soviet Union should be entitled to their own socialist territory, was the 
Russians. Contrary to what is often believed, the largest Union republic, the 
Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR), was not named after the 
Russian nation. Rather, its designation was derived from the supra-ethnic 
name which Peter the Great give his empire, Rossiia While the distinction 
between rossiiskii, referring to the state, and russkii referring to language, 
culture, and ethnicity, is blurred in English and most other languages, it is 
unambiguously clear in Russian.  
 
                                           
22 The number varied from census to census, reflecting changing political winds in Moscow as well as the 
effect of assimilatory processes on the ground. See Francine Hirsch, ‘The Soviet Union as a Work-In-
Progress’, Slavic Review 56, no. 2 (1997), 251--278.  
23 The Germans did have their own autonomous oblast on the Volga but this was abolished in 1941 when 
its population was deported to Kazakhstan and Kirgizia on the suspicion that they might try to collaborate 
with the Nazi invaders if they got the chance.  
24 While some Ukrainian-language schools existed in Northern Caucasus and Moldova under Stalin, the 
last of these were scrapped under Khrushchev. 
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Does this mean that the Russians were a stateless people in the Soviet 
period, as some Russian nationalists claim today?25 Hardly. Instead, most 
ethnic Russians in the Soviet Union identified with not one particular Union 
republic -- the RSFSR -- but with the Union as a whole, the ‘Socialist 
Fatherland’.26 They felt equally at home in all nooks and crannies of this 
huge multinational state, and did not really have a feeling of being a 
‘minority’ anywhere, not even in those republics where they constituted a 
tiny fraction of the total population. At as result, as summarised by Paul 
Goble, ‘For all groups except the Russians, nationality was completely 
territorialized: one had language and other ethnic rights only within one’s 
own ethnic territory. Russians, on the other hand, enjoyed extraterritorial 
status, that is, the right to use their own language and to have their own 
Russian-language institutions throughout the country’.27 
 
In her seminal study Ethnic relations in the USSR, the perspective from 
below (1986), Rasma Karklins made the distinction between territorially 
based groups, on the one hand, and extraterritorial and dispersed groups, on 
the other, her most important analytical tool. ‘Territoriality provides a 
people with a much more distinct historical and cultural identity as well as 
more clearly identifiable cultural, economic, and political interests’, she 
maintained.28 In most cases the non-titular nationalities in the Soviet 
republics were subordinate to the territorially based group, according to 
Karklins, but the Russians were not. ‘This is a source of conflict with the 
titular nations of the non-Russian union republics who feel that within 
"their" republics they should be the decisive group’.29  
 
The Russians outside the RSFSR: for whom the bell tolled 
Under perestroika the time of the non-Russian titulars had come. The story 
of the dissolution of the Soviet Union is well known; here only one aspect 
                                           
25 See e.g. Viktor Kozlov, ‘Glavnyi natsional’nyi vopros v Rossii vchera i segodnya’, Etnopoliticheskii 
vestnik Rossii, no. 2 (1992), 97--109; and Kseniia Mialo, ‘Izgnannaia natsiia. Russkie kak inozemtsy’, Vek 
XX i mir, no. 9--10 (1994), 20--29.  
26 Leokadia Drobizheva, ‘Russian ethnonationalism’, in Leokadia Drobizheva, Rose Gottemoeller, 
Catherine McArdle Kelleher, and Lee Walker, Ethnic Conflict in the Post-Soviet World. Case Studies and 
Analysis (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1996/1998), 129--147, p. 132. 
27 Paul Goble, ‘Three Faces of Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union’, in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., 
Nationalism and nationalities in the New Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University press, 1995), 122--135, p. 
125. Although it is quite clear what Goble means, he perhaps overstates his point somewhat. As already 
mentioned, the Russians also had a territorial attachment, but it was general, directed towards in the Soviet 
state as a whole, not towards one particular part of the country.  
28 Karklins, Ethnic Relations, 6.  
29 Ibid., 1986, 8. 
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will be discussed: the titular groups’ active use of their territoriality in their 
struggle to achieve supremacy over the local Russians and other 
Russophones in the Union republics.  
 
Glasnost opened up formerly unheard-of possibilities to vent complaints and 
resentments of all kinds in the Soviet press, including ethnic grievances. The 
Russian researcher V.K. Malkova has shown how the concept of the 
ethnically understood ‘us’ changed in the non-Russian press during 
perestroika. The ‘we’ was associated with national history; with the 
language, culture, and economy -- and the territory of the group.30 
 
The political exploitation of territoriality in the Soviet Union during 
perestroika passed through several phases, Malkova writes. First, the 
damage which the Communist regime had caused to the ecology and 
environment of the national homelands was exposed and decried. In the next 
phase, praise for the beauty of nature was crowded out by calls for political 
and economic independence for the national territory. In the third stage, 
territoriality was turned into a weapon against ‘alien’ ethnic elements living 
in the national territory, the ‘migrants’, ‘the newcomers’, and -- in some 
republics -- ‘the occupants’. This third stage did not set in at the same time 
in the various republics, but may generally be dated to around 1989–90.  
 
At this time, one particular Russian ethnographer, Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev, 
acquired a measure of popularity among the general Soviet public which 
most scholars around the world could only envy him. Gumilev’s mother, 
Anna Akhmatova, was one of most celebrated icons of Russian literature, 
while his father, Nikolai Gumilev, also a poet, had been shot for 
counterrevolutionary activity in 1921. Gumilev Jr had himself spent years of 
his life in Stalin’s prison camps, and many of his books had been banned by 
Soviet censorship. This exceptional biography probably provides part of the 
explanation for the almost explosive interest in his works as soon as they 
were allowed through the censorship during glasnost.31 Another, equally 
important reason was that they fit like hand in glove with the struggle for 
political independence launched by non-Russian elites at the same time.  
                                           
30 V.K. Malkova, Obrazy etnosov v respublikanskikh gazetakh (Moscow: Institut etnologii i antropologii, 
1991), 56. 
31 At the flea market in Odessa in 1992 a second-hand book by Gumilev fetched eight dollars in hard 
currency, eight times as much as a volume of Stalin’s collected works, and fifty times as much as a hard-
cover edition of one of Solzhenitsyn’s novels. Also in such distant places as Riga and Almaty the present 
author experienced exuberant praise for Gumilev during the early 1990s. 
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In the monograph The Geography of The Ethnos in the Historical Period, 
Gumilev explains that the ethnic diversity of the human race is caused by 
geography. The various ethnic groups and cultural traditions of mankind are 
formed under the influence of the different landscapes and climatic 
conditions of the globe.  
 
The ethnos is not a biological and not a social phenomenon. Instead, I 
propose that we regard it as a geographical phenomenon. It is always 
linked to a landscape in which it is seated and which feeds the ethnos 
that is adapted to it. And since the landscapes of the world are 
different from each other, so are the ethnoses.32  
 
This geographical determinism was one of the reasons why Gumilev’s books 
had been roundly denounced by the captains of Soviet ethnography.33 An 
implicit corollary of Gumilev’s theory was that migrant communities were 
literally ‘out of place’. Gumilev himself, who died in 1992, would no doubt 
have denied that diaspora groups with weak attachment to the soil should 
have fewer rights. Nevertheless, this was often the conclusion drawn by non-
Russian nationalist activists.34 To them, Gumilev’s theories provided a 
(quasi-)academic and non-communist confirmation of the ideas which the 
Soviet nationalities practices had already imbued in them: full-fledged, 
genuine nations have their own territory. Cultural rights are collective and 
restricted to a specific territory. Diaspora groups have no territory of their 
own and should have no collective rights.  
 
 
Not one diaspora, but fourteen 
The Russian minority communities in the non-Russian former Soviet 
republics are far from homogeneous. Any talk of ‘a’ or ‘the’ new Russian 
                                           
32 L.N. Gumilev, Geografiia etnosa v istoricheskii period (Leningrad: Nauka, 1990), 17. Emphasis in the 
original.  
33 See e.g. Viktor I. Kozlov, ‘O biologo-geograficheskoi kontseptsii etnicheskoi istorii’, Voprosy istorii, 
no. 12 (1974), 72--85.  
34 Another crucial element of Gumilev’s organic theory of ethnicity was his idea of passionarnost’, a 
Russian neologism based on the Latin word passio, or passion. Passionarnost’ was supposed to be a 
measure of the collective energy of the ethnos, its inner striving towards the realisation of its coveted aims. 
The passionarnost’ of the various nations waxes and wanes. At a time when some nations have reached a 
stage of stagnation and torpor others may be bursting with vitality and energy. During perestroika many 
non-Russians believed that this theory accurately described the national blossoming they were 
experiencing.  
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diaspora in the singular is highly misleading. It would probably be more 
fruitful to see them as fourteen different diasporas, each with their own 
peculiar characteristics. The qualities of each community are influenced by 
many different factors, such as their size (absolute, and relative to the total 
population in the state), ethnic cohesion, social composition, cultural 
distinctiveness (the cultural contrast to the dominant ethnic environment), the 
compactness of their settlements, and rootedness in the area.35  
 
Table 1  
RUSSIANS IN THE SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES, 1989 
 
 
Republic 
 
In 
thousand
s 
Percentage 
of total pop. 
in rep. 
Percentage 
of non-
titular pop. 
in rep. 
Percentage 
of 
Russians 
living in 
urban 
settlements 
Russians 
claiming 
fluency in 
tit. lang., 
in percent
Russia 119,866 81.5 – 77 100.0
Estonia 475 30.3 78.8 92 14.9
Latvia 906 34.0 70.7 85 22.0
Lithuania 344 9.4 45.8 90 37.5
Belarus 1,342 13.2 59.5 87 27.3
Moldova 562 13.0 36.4 86 11.7
Ukraine 11,356 22.1 80.8 88 34.0
Georgia 341 6.3 21.1 86 23.0
Armenia 52 1.6 23.0 85 33.0
Azerbaijan 392 5.6 32.2 95 14.5
Turkmenistan 334 9.5 33.7 97 2.3
Tajikistan 388 7.6 20.2 94 3.3
Uzbekistan 1,653 8.3 29.1 95 4.6
Kyrgyzstan 917 21.5 45.1 70 1.2
Kazakhstan 6,228 37.8 62.6 77 0.8
Sources: Natsional’nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR, (Moscow: Finansy i 
statistika, 1991); in Iu. V. Arutiunian (ed.), Russkie. Etnosotsiologicheskie 
ocherki. (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), p. 25. 
 
Some 12.5 million diaspora Russians, or roughly half of the total, are living 
                                           
35 For more details, see Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics (C.Hurst/Indiana University 
Press: London/Bloomington, 1995).  
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in the Slavic states of Ukraine and Belarus (see Table 1). In this region, the 
cultural distance between the Russians and the titular nations is very short. 
With the partial exception of Western Ukraine, hardly any Russians here 
have a feeling of living in an alien cultural environment at all. 
 
In the Baltic states important parts of the indigenous population claim that a 
yawning chasm separates their own culture from Russian culture, while the 
Russians themselves more often underline the common elements of 
European-ness, Christian faith, etc. which unite them. After the incorporation 
of the Baltic states into the USSR during World War II the influx of Russians 
and other Russophones to the area was dramatically steep. In the course of 
four decades, the share of the titular nation in the total population dropped 
from 90 per cent to 60 per cent in Estonia and from 75 per cent to 52 per cent 
in Latvia. Many Balts feel that this demographic development is undermining 
the very basis of their separate cultures, and are determined to roll back 
Russian influence. The Russians, however, are already so numerous and so 
entrenched in society that this is a formidable task which can be 
accomplished only by exceptional measures, if at all. Only in Lithuania is the 
proportion of the Russians so low (around 9 per cent) that they are not 
perceived as a serious challenge by the titular nation. 
 
In Transcaucasia and the southern tier of Central Asia, Russian demographic 
penetration has historically been weak. In the 1989 census the Russians’ 
share of the total population in all of these republics was below 10 per cent 
(in Armenia as low as 1.6 per cent); since that time, Russian communities in 
much of the region have been further depleted by out-migration. The Russian 
populace has been almost exclusively clustered in the larger towns and cities, 
particularly in the capitals, while the countryside has been dominated by the 
locals.  
 
In Kazakhstan and to some degree also in Kyrgyzstan, the ethno-
demographic situation is rather different from other parts of Central Asia. On 
the Kazakh steppe and in the Kyrgyz valleys, Russian peasants have been 
tilling the soil for generations. These are the only republics where rural 
dwellers make up substantial parts of the local Russian groups (23 per cent 
and 30 per cent, respectively). At the same time, the Russian presence in 
urban areas is also very large. The 900,000 Russians in Kyrgyzstan made up 
more than 20 per cent of the total population in the 1989 census, while the 6 
million Russians in Kazakhstan at that time constituted no less than 45 per 
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cent. The vast majority of Kazakhstani Russians live in the northernmost 
parts of the country. 
 
While there are large differences between the various Russian diaspora 
communities there are also of course significant differences within each 
group. Some members of these communities have been living outside the 
ethnic Russian core area for generations, whereas others are recent 
immigrants. These newcomers are typically less able, or willing, to adapt to 
the alien ethnic environment. Their command of the titular language is 
usually poorer. The language proficiency among the Russian diasporians is 
also influenced by such factors as the complexity of the various languages 
and the number of native speakers they meet in daily life, but even more, it 
seems, by such intangibles as the ‘prestige’ the various languages carry.36 In 
the Soviet Union, European languages with long literary traditions had a 
higher status than Asian languages with recently established literary 
standards. 
 
 
Adjusting to a life in the diaspora 
When the Union republics were proclaimed as independent states during the 
second half of 1991, no formal distinctions were made among their citizens 
on ethnic criteria. With two exceptions -- Latvia and Estonia -- all former 
Soviet republics granted the status as original citizens to all persons residing 
permanently in their territory at the time when independence was proclaimed 
(or alternatively, when the new citizenship law was adopted or entered into 
force). Latvia and Estonia awarded the status of original citizens only to 
citizens of the interwar Latvian, respectively Estonian republic and their 
descendants, but neither in these countries were formal distinctions made in 
the constitutions or citizenship laws dividing permanent residents according 
to ethnic criteria.  
 
It is necessary to underline the word ‘formal’ here. While all of the new 
states make efforts to live up to Western ideas about ‘civic statehood’ in 
their legislative practices, the ethnicity-neutral formulations in their legal 
acts are often a play to the gallery. As Rogers Brubaker has perceptively 
remarked, the civic principles in their public declarations remain external. 
 
                                           
36 Aadne Aasland, ‘Russians outside Russia. The New Russian Diaspora’ in Graham Smith (ed.), The 
Nationalities question in the post-Soviet States (London: Longman, 1996), 477--498. 
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It is hard to imagine a civic understanding coming to prevail given 
the pervasively institutionalised understanding of nationality as 
fundamentally ethnocultural rather than political, as sharply distinct 
from citizenship, and as grounding claims to ‘ownership’ of polities 
-- (which, after all, were expressly constructed of and for their 
eponymous ethnocultural nations).37 
 
Evidence in support of Brubaker’s view is not difficult to find. In April 
1996, a local newspaper in Latvia printed a letter from a reader who claimed 
that  
  
Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians who live in Latvia may not be 
regarded as national minorities, since all these people have their own 
ethnic territories somewhere else in the world. If they want to live in 
the territory of Latvia, they must without any reservations accept all the 
laws, the social structure, the mentality, language, and culture of the 
Latvians, in short, everything that characterises the life of the Latvian 
people.38 
 
Outbursts like this may perhaps be dismissed as extremist, and indeed, such 
categorical language will rarely be found in official documents. Even so, the 
reasoning behind many legal acts and official pronunciations in the new 
states bears a striking resemblance to the ideas expressed by this Latvian 
reader. A good example is the Latvian language law. Adopted in its original 
form in October 1988, it underwent radical changes in March 1992. In the 
first version, Russian-speaking residents had been guaranteed various 
important rights which were scrapped in the revised edition. What concerns 
us here is the official justification which was given for these changes in the 
preamble of this law: ‘Latvia is the sole ethnic territory in the world 
populated by the Latvian nation. The Latvian language is one of the most 
important preconditions for the survival of the Latvian nation and for the 
                                           
37 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the national question in the New Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 432. 
38 Netkariga Rita Avize, 11 April 1996, as quoted in Aina Antane and Boris Tsilevich, ‘Nation-building and 
Ethnic Integration in Latvia’, in Pål Kolstø, ed., Nation-building and ethnic integration in post-Soviet 
societies. An investigation of Latvia and Kazakhstan (Boulder, Colorado: Westview press, 1999), 63--151, 
p. 85.  
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preservation and development of its culture’.39 This was an unequivocal 
expression of an ethno-territorial understanding of the nation.40 
 
A similar reasoning lay behind the decision to make Belorussian the sole 
state language of the Belorussian SSR in 1990, in spite of the fact that 
Russian was spoken by a larger part of the population. The Belorussian 
legislators acknowledged that ‘In Belorussia people representing many 
different nationalities have been living for a very long time’. However, one 
of these peoples, the Belorussians, have a special attachment to the land, it 
was asserted; they are indigenous (korennye). ‘It has become necessary to 
protect the Belorussian language in its state-ethnic territory 
(gosudarstvenno-etnicheskoi territorii)’.41 
 
Also in neighbouring Ukraine more people are familiar with Russian than 
with the titular language. the protection of the Russian language, therefore, 
would presumably be a smart cause to promote in Ukrainian politics, and 
indeed, during the 1994 presidential elections the winning contender, Leonid 
Kuchma, himself a Russian-speaking Ukrainian, promised to introduce 
Russian as an official language.42 This pledge earned him the ire of 
Ukrainian ethnonationalists. In a blistering attack, Mykhailo Kosiv, the 
chairman of the Committee on Cultural Affairs in the Ukrainian Parliament, 
asserted that  
 
Ukraine is the Fatherland of the Ukrainian people. This is a people that 
has realised its sacred right to self-determination and has created the 
Ukrainian state, in which there also live some national minorities. […] 
The Russian people live in Russia, whereas smaller segments of this 
                                           
39 M.N. Guboglo, Perelomnye gody. Tom 2. Iazykovaia reforma -- 1989. Dokumenty i materialy. (Moscow: 
Tsimo. 1994), 36. 
40 A new and even more restrictive Latvian language law was adopted by the Saeima on 8 July 1999, and 
was severely criticised by several European Human rights organisations and by the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities. The Latvian president has therefore refused to sign it and has 
returned it to the legislators.  
41 Guboglo, Perelomnye gody, 92. It must be added here that this argumentation was not accepted by the 
Belorussian population at large. In a referendum in May 1995 85 percent of the voters supported the idea 
of granting Russian status as a state language on a par with Belarusian. Under its current autocratic 
president. Aliaksandr Lukashenka, Belarus is today clearly moving away from ethnic nation-building. 
42 He made a fine distinction between ‘state language’ and ‘official language’. Whereas Ukrainian would 
remain the sole ‘state language’ of the country, Russian would be given the status of an ‘official language’. 
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people live as national minorities in Ukraine (as they also do in Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Belarus, etc.).43 
 
This was a clear-cut case of assigning ethnic groups to specific territories 
and linking rights to these assignments. And Kosiv and those who think like 
him had their way. In a remarkable political turnabout president Kuchma 
shelved the plans to give Russian an official status. The new Ukrainian 
constitution adopted in June 1996 mentions only one state language -- 
Ukrainian.  
 
The first Kazakhstani Constitution adopted after independence (in 1993) 
opened with a reference to the supranational entity: ‘We, the people of 
Kazakhstan’. The very first article, however, declared that the state of 
Kazakhstan is ‘the Kazakh people’s form of statehood’ -- an ethnically based 
concept of the nation had somehow managed to sneak its way in again. 
Russophone activists in Almaty maintained that the terms ‘the people of 
Kazakhstan’ and ‘the Kazakh people’ were used synonymously in the 
Constitution: the fact that half of the population are the Russian-speakers 
was ignored.44 Possibly in an attempt to alleviate such fears, when a new 
constitution was adopted in 1995, the reference to ‘the Kazakh people’s 
statehood’ was omitted. However, at the same time a new formulation was 
added that even more explicitly than before underlined the special and 
exclusive attachment of the ethnic Kazakhs to the territory of the 
Kazakhstani republic. ‘We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common 
historical fate, have created a statehood on the ancient land (iskonnaia 
zemlia) of the ethnic Kazakhs’.45 A Western expert on Kazakhstan sees this 
as an even stronger expression of ethnocentric nation-building than the 
formulations of the previous constitution.46 
 
*** 
 
The struggle for and against certain formulas in the constitutions and other 
official documents in the Soviet successor states is not an academic game of 
words for philologists, but rather the symbolic expression of hard-nosed 
                                           
43 Mykhailo Kosiv, ‘Bez movy, nemae narodu, bez narodu, nemae derzhavy’, Holos Ukrainy, 16 
September 1994. 
44 See for example the article by Prof. V. Moiseev in Rossiiskaia gazeta, 27 August 1993. 
45 ‘Konstitutsiia respubliki Kazakhstan’, Mysl’, (Almaty), no. l0 (1995), 3--22. 
46 Shirin Akiner, The formation of Kazakh Identity. From Tribe to Nation-State (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995), 69. 
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power politics. In Kazakhstan, for instance, ethnic Kazakhs have been able 
to dominate political life to an extent far out of proportion to their 
demographic strength. As pointed out above, tendencies in this direction 
were evident already in the late Soviet period, but have clearly been 
strengthened since independence. Thus, while the Kazakhs made up 
approximately 45 per cent of the total population in 1994, and an even 
smaller proportion of the adults, a full 60 per cent of the seats in the 
Kazakhstani Supreme Soviet were filled by ethnic Kazakhs at that time. The 
Russians made up some 35 per cent of the population but only 28 per cent of 
the MPs belonged to this group. In the new two-tiered parliament established 
in 1995 26 Kazakhs and 12 Russians were in part elected, in part appointed 
to the upper chamber, the Senate.47 In the presidential apparatus -- the real 
focus of power -- the ethnic incongruities were even more glaring. In the 
spring of 1994, there were 74 per cent ethnic Kazakhs, 23 per cent Slavs, 
and 3 per cent representing non-Slav minorities (Koreans, Uzbeks, etc.) in 
president Nazarbaev’s staff.48  
 
Kazakhstan is not an exception. In Latvia and Estonia the clear 
predominance of the titular population in political life is of course primarily 
secured through the exclusionary citizenship policies, but these policies by 
themselves do not provide the whole explanation for the political 
overrepresentation of the titulars. Although some 5 per cent of the Estonian 
citizenship population in 1992 were non-Estonians in the ethnic sense, the 
100-member Estonian parliament Riigikogu elected that year did not have a 
five-member strong non-titular faction. Instead, it was made up of ethnic 
Estonians exclusively. In Latvia, Russians represented approximately 16 per 
cent of the citizens in 1993 and 1995, but had only 6 per cent of the deputies 
of the parliament, the Saeima.49 In January 1994 it became known that of 
Latvia’s 152 judges, 142 were ethnic Latvians. No Russian has ever been 
appointed minister in a Latvian government.50 
                                           
47 Bhavna Dave, ‘A New Parliament Consolidates Presidential Authority’, Transition 2, 6 (22 March 
1996), 33-37; Pål Kolstø, ‘Anticipating Demographic Superiority. Kazakh Thinking On Integration And 
Nation Building’, Europe-Asia Studies 50, no. 1 (1998), 51-68.  
48 A.B. Galiev, E. Babakumarov, Zh. Zhansugurova and A. Peruashev, Mezhnatsional’nye otnosheniia v 
Kazakhstane. Etnicheskii aspekt kadrovoi politiki (Almaty: Institut razvitiia Kazakhstana, 1994); O 
demograficheskoi situatsii v 1995 godu (Almaty: Pravitel’stvo respubliki Kazakhstan, 1996); Kolstø, 
‘Anticipating Demographic Superiority’, 63.  
49 The situation improved considerably, however, when ten of the 100 Latvian MPs elected to the 7th 
Saiema in 1998 were Russians, in addition to another nine hailing from non-Russian minorities. 
50 Pål Kolstø and Boris Tsilevich, ‘Bulletin of Electoral Statistics and Public Opinion Research Data: 
Patterns of Nation Building and Political Integration in a Bifurcated Post-communist State: Ethnic Aspects 
of Parliamentary Elections in Latvia’, East European Politics and Societies 11, no. 2 (1997), 366--391. 
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The Russia factor 
Russian politicians across the board express grave concern about the 
political and cultural discrimination of Russians in the other Soviet 
successor states. They all agree that Russia has an obligation to act as their 
protector but disagree about the best ways to provide such protection, as well 
as how Russia’s special role as human rights watch dog in the Baltic 
countries and the CIS area ought to be justified. It is the latter point which 
concerns us here.51  
 
Roughly speaking, two principally different views have emerged from the 
Russian debate on the legitimacy of Russian interference in the nationality 
policy of the neighbour states, views that correspond to two different 
perceptions of ‘the Russian homeland’. Russian democrats define 
contemporary ‘Russia’ as identical with ‘the Russian Federation’, the 
internationally recognised successor state to the Soviet Union. Nationalists, 
Communists, and imperialists of various hues, however, who do not accept 
the break-up of the Soviet Union as an accomplished fact, continue to 
identify with this defunct country as their homeland.52 Certain nuances and 
varieties in this position may be discerned: the Communists regard the 
USSR as the multinational homeland of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, 
while ethnocratic Russian imperialists see this state as the latest incarnation 
of the Russian empire in which ethnic Russians ought to play first fiddle. In 
both varieties, the political independence of the non-Russian successor states 
is regarded as illegitimate. The Russian minorities living in these states 
ought to be full-fledged members of the same Russian state like all other 
Russians.53 
 
The influential journalist Eduard Volodin is a leading ideologue of the 
restorationist view. In a hard-hitting article written in 1995 he presented a 
kind of Lebensraum justification for Russian revanchism without beating 
about the bush: ‘The nation together with its social structure possesses a 
certain geographical (territorial) space and this space has to be defended 
                                           
51 The first question is discussed in Paul Kolstoe, Russians in the Former Soviet Republics, 
(C.Hurst/Indiana University Press, London/Bloomington, 1995), 259--89.  
52 V.I. Mukomel’, ‘Problemy rossiiskoi diaspory v kontekste vnutripoliticheskoi bor’by’, Informatsionno-
analiticheskii biulleten’, Analiticheskoe upravlenie prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 1, May (1995), 53--
76, pp. 56--57.  
53 Vera Tolz, ‘Conflicting “Homeland Myths” and Nation-State Building in postcommunist Russia’, Slavic 
Review 57, no. 2 (1998.), 267--294. 
 19
against outside invaders’. The instrument that the nation uses to protect its 
territory is the State. Any nation worthy of the name must have a territory 
large enough for its members to move about freely, without getting in each 
others’ way. And that is why, according to Volodin, Central Asia belongs 
to the natural territory of Russia. Also the Russian presence in the Baltic is 
vital and historically legitimate.54  
 
In contrast to this view, Russian politicians who accept the break-up of the 
Soviet Union are faced with the task of explaining why Russia should be 
entitled to a say in what the leaders of the other former Soviet republics 
regard as their ‘internal affairs’. The simplistic answer to this question is 
that Russia is the state formation of the Russian nation, and the fact that 
some members of this nation happen to be living in other countries, does 
not deprive of them of the right of Russian protection. However, as 
explained above, Russia was not the homeland of ethnic Russians, and they 
are not assigned any status as the ‘titular nation’ of the present-day Russian 
Federation either. Responsible Russian politicians strenuously try not to 
fall into ‘the ethnic trap’: After all, their main criticism against the other 
Soviet successor states is that these states are based on an exclusionist, 
ethnic concept of the nation which favours the titulars over other groups. 
Russian liberals must weight their words carefully lest their statements be 
interpreted as expressions of a similar kind of ethnic thinking.  
 
During the early 1990s Russian authorities experimented with various terms 
by which to designate the relationship of Russia to the diaspora communities 
in the ‘near abroad’. Certain expressions seem to have been rejected at an 
early stage and are rarely used in the official lexicon. They include words 
like ‘diaspora’ and ‘minority’ (whether ‘national’, ‘ethnic’, or ‘cultural’). 
The choice of the word ‘minority’ might have signalled that the Russian 
authorities regard these groups as territorially based in their respective 
countries of residence. Instead, terms like grazhdane (citizens) and 
vykhodtsy (those who hail from, or have left, Russia) were bandied about. In 
May 1991, for instance, Boris Yeltsin stated that ‘vykhodtsy from Russia live 
in all republics of the Union, and we will not abandon those of our 
grazhdane who live there to the mercy of fate’.55 This remark, however, was 
made before the break-up of the Soviet Union. While the term grazhdane 
                                           
54 Eduard Volodin, ‘Sud’ba russkoi natsii -- sud’ba Rossii’, Molodaia gvardiia, no. 4 (1995), 3--16, on 9--
10. 
55 Izvestiia, 24 May 1991. 
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could at this time perhaps be used in such a vague and metaphorical sense, 
after the adoption of citizenship laws in Russia and the other successor states 
it acquired a very precise meaning: persons holding a Russian passport.56 
Only a small fraction of the new Russian diaspora belongs to this group in 
the strict sense. By the spring of 1997 approximately one million Russian 
diasporians, or 4 per cent of the total, had obtained Russian citizenship and 
most of the others will probably not do so in the foreseeable future.57  
 
Another term in circulation is russkoiazychnye, ‘Russian-speakers’, and a 
fourth is etnicheskie rossiiane or ‘ethnic rossiiane’.58 Since the neologism 
rossiiane had been invented under perestroika precisely in order to find an 
ethnically neutral way to describe the citizens of Russia, ‘ethnic rossiiane’ 
sounded like a curious hybrid, bordering on an oxymoron.59 
 
The term which Russian officialdom seems to have settled on is 
sootechestvenniki, which literally means ‘compatriots’. A special Duma 
committee is called ‘the Committee on CIS affairs and Compatriots Abroad’, 
and in November 1998 the Russian parliament adopted a law on ‘The State 
Policy Of The Russian Federation Towards Compatriots Abroad’.60 Also the 
president and his apparatus show a clear preference for this term. In August 
1994 the Russian government adopted an important policy document, ‘The 
main directions of the state policy of the Russian Federation towards 
sootechestvenniki living abroad’.61 The document declared that ‘the 
Government of the Russian Federation intends to make use of all possible 
acceptable means under international law to ensure that the rights of its 
                                           
56 However, also at a later stage grazhdane continued to be used occasionally in official documents in a 
very loose sense, divorced from the legal context of state citizenship. See E.I. Filippova, ‘Novaia russkaia 
diaspora’, in Martynova, Novye slavianskie diaspory, 45--80, p. 58. 
57 This figure gives the total number of former Soviet citizens outside Russia who had taken Russian 
citizenship, but since very many do so on the eve of leaving for Russia no one, it seems, not even Russian 
authorities, knows for sure how many of these continue to live in one of the non-Russian Soviet successor 
states today. Most likely this figure is considerably lower.  
58 Neil Melvin, Russians Beyond Russia. The Politics of National Identity (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1995), 16; Mukomel’, ‘Problemy rossiiskoi diaspory’.  
59 At a press briefing in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1992, a Ministry spokesman 
defined ‘etnicheskie rossiiane’ as ‘all vykhodtsy from Russia, (irrespective of generation) who are living 
abroad. Ethnicity (natsional’nost) plays no role’. Quoted in Estoniia, 6 June 1992, 2.  
60 ‘Zakon o gosudarstvennoi politike Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennkov za rubezhem. 
[Law On The State Policy Of The Russian Federation Towards Compatriots Abroad]’, adopted on 13 
November 1998.  
61 ‘Osnovnye napravleniia gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v otnoshenii sootechestvennikov, 
prozhivaiushchikh sa rubezhom’, Postanovlenie Pravitel’stva Rossiiskoi Federatsii 31 August 1994, no. 
1064. 
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compatriots abroad are not encroached upon’. That Russia has a right and, 
indeed, a moral obligation to pose as a protector of the Russian diaspora 
communities in the neighbouring states was apparently regarded as so 
obvious that the case did not even have to be argued.62 Russia was 
designated as ‘the historical motherland’ (istoricheskaia rodina) of the 
Russians. The use of the term ‘historic’ in this context, would, one might 
think, make the relationship of Russia to these communities a thing of the 
past. But no, the strong message of this and similar documents is that Russia, 
also at the present time, has a very definite role to play in the life of the 
Russian minorities in the other Soviet successor states. 
 
At the same time, the same document states that it is a priority concern of the 
Russian government ‘to promote the voluntary integration of [the 
compatriots] into the political, social, and economic life of the newly 
independent states’. This objective, however, may well be obstructed by the 
very terminology it employs and by the general thinking on the Russian 
diaspora issue which it reflects. To the same degree as Russia poses as a 
protector of the Russophone minorities in the neighbouring states and is 
becoming involved in the domestic affairs of these countries, this 
involvement may -- almost irrespective of motives and causes -- induce local 
Russians to direct their political and cultural allegiance not towards their 
country of residence, but towards Russia. Thus, the stronger the authorities 
of the Russian Federation argue their right defend the Russians in the 
neighbouring states -- by posing as their historical fatherland -- the more 
they may weaken the local territoriality of these people and, indirectly at 
least, also the basis for their rights in their state of residence.63 
 
The remarkable fact is that, in spite of representing very different interests 
on the Russian diaspora issue, the political pronouncements of both Russia 
and the new nationalising states tend to propel the local Russians in the same 
direction, towards the external homeland rather than towards local 
territoriality, as push and pull factors respectively. The dominant discourse 
in Russian politics as well as in their country of residence tells them that 
Russia is where they ‘really’ belong. To be sure, no one denounces them as 
                                           
62 In Neil Melvin’s view, it is an important element of official Russian self-understanding today that Russia 
is a ‘diasporic state’. Neil Melvin, ‘The Russians: Diaspora and the End of Empire’, in Charles King and 
Neil J. Melvin, Nations Abroad, 27--58, p. 47.  
63 To point out this tension between aims and means is not the same as to pass a normative judgement on it. 
The morality of Russian diaspora policies must be judged by other criteria. 
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‘rootless cosmopolitans’. Everyone acknowledges that they do have roots, 
only not in the local soil. 
 
Territorialising the diasporas 
However, deeds speak louder than words and many Russian diasporians feel 
that the actions -- or rather the inaction -- of the Russian state belie its 
intentions. The ‘Main Directions’ programme of the Russian government 
fleshes out a number of specific measures which the Russian state pledges to 
undertake to protect the Russian ‘compatriots’ -- in the fields of media and 
information technology; diplomacy; economic support; and social and 
cultural measures. The social and cultural fields, in particular, might seem 
promising in this respect. Hardly anyone in the new states would object to 
Russian state support for local Russian cultural centres. Germany, Poland, 
Turkey, Israel, and other ‘external homelands’ are already actively 
supporting schools, media outlets, and cultural activities of ‘their’ respective 
diasporas in the former Soviet republics, without provoking any negative 
reactions. Furthermore, such cultural support would not require very great 
outlays for the Russian state, at least not compared to other types of 
engagements in the CIS states, such as military interventions. 
 
Even so, those Russians and other Russophones in the ‘near abroad’ who try 
to organise their co-ethnics for joint cultural activities often feel that the 
financial support they receive from the Russian state leaves much to be 
desired. A good case in point is the struggle for control over the old Palace 
of Peter the Great  in Riga in 1997. The Latvian Centre of Russian Culture 
finally won the right to rent the palace and tried to turn it into a Russian 
cultural centre. It soon transpired, however, that the organisation was unable 
to cover the expenses for its restoration and maintenance and the Latvian 
government threatened to annul the tenancy contract.64 The Russian 
ambassador to Latvia involved himself in the matter, but not by pledging 
Russian authorities to support this project financially, as it had been hoped 
that he would do. Instead, he signed a petition appealing for donations.65 
Russophone activists in other Soviet successor states can tell similar stories 
about tightly held Russian purse strings.66 
                                           
64 SM-segodnia, 28 January 1997. 
65 Antane and Tsilevich, ‘Nation-building and Ethnic Integration’, 146. 
66 Author’s interviews with, inter alia, Aleksandr Belopotapov and Ivan Garev at the Russian Cultural 
Centre in Chisinau, September 1992; Nina Sidorova at the Russian Cultural Centre and Iurii Bunakov in 
‘the Russian Community’, both in Almaty, May 1993; and Halida Agapova, Narva Labour Union, Narva, 
January 1999.  
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As long as the Russian state is unwilling to ‘put its money where its mouth 
is’ -- to give the saying a slightly new meaning -- the Russian minorities in 
the former Soviet republics might find its loud declarations of support less 
than convincing. The concept of ‘a beached diaspora’ acquires the added 
quality, as it were, of ‘a marooned diaspora’. This feeling of abandonment 
weakens the ties to the ‘historical homeland’ and induces the Russians to try 
to find a new footing in the local community, by relying on themselves. 
Thus, while the rhetoric of diaspora politics in Russia may tend to sustain an 
‘external territoriality’ for the Russian diaspora communities, the -- actual or 
perceived -- inaction of Russia in support of these communities may turn 
them away from Russia towards their new homelands. 
 
*** 
 
In contrast to the ‘compatriots’’ discourse in Moscow some Russian 
diaspora leaders are consciously cultivating an alternative discourse, about 
‘indigenousness’.67 The message of this discourse is that ‘We are no less 
indigenous than you, the titulars, are’. Or, if this sounds unconvincing: ‘we 
will do our utmost to become just as territorial as you are.’  
 
When a ‘Law on national minorities’ was discussed in Ukraine in early 
1992, the Russophone ‘Party of Slavic Unity’ published a statement 
protesting against the very concept of ‘minority’. ‘Families of Russians, 
Belorussians, Poles, Greeks, Crimean Tatars, and other people who have 
lived for centuries in Ukraine, are not national minorities, but indigenous 
(korennye) inhabitants or Ukraine’, the party insisted.68 In the same year a 
Russian historian from Ust-Kamenogorsk, a compactly Slavic city in the 
north-eastern Altai region of Kazakhstan, wrote a small treatise on Russians, 
Kazakhs, and Altai. His message was that ethnic Kazakhs had no right to 
claim Kazakhstan as their exclusive ancient homeland -- at least not in north-
                                           
67 To be sure, many of the diaspora leaders themselves -- those who agree with the ‘red-brown’ 
restorationists in Moscow -- will not accept my view that this discourse about ‘indigenousness’ represents 
an alternative to the ‘compatriots’’ discourse. On the contrary, since ‘Russia’ in their view ought to be 
coterminous with the territory of the former Soviet Union, they will tend to see these two discourses as 
basically two versions of the same message. 
68 Zaiavlenie Partii Slavianskogo Edinstva (Ukrainy). Undated leaflet.  
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eastern Kazakhstan. ‘The terms “indigenous people” and “indigenous 
inhabitants” . . . are incorrect.’69 
 
Other Russians in Kazakhstan argue the case of local territoriality for the 
non-titular population in slightly different terms. They point not to the 
record of past centuries, but to the life stories of the people who live in 
Kazakhstan today. Surveys in Kazakhstan indicate that the majority of the 
Slavic inhabitants are either born in the country or have lived there for more 
than ten years. The organiser of one of these surveys wrote in her analytical 
report that ‘as the tables show, the non-titular persons interviewed have 
struck rather deep roots (ukorenilis) in the soil of Kazakhstan. They have life 
traditions here stretching several generations back, and their dear ones are 
buried here’.70  
 
Similar observations have been made in the Baltics. Having conducted a 
series of surveys in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, Richard Rose of the 
University of Strathclyde concluded that a large majority of the Russian-
speakers in these countries have a pair of identities: as Russians, and as 
residents of a city of a region within a Baltic state. ‘Significantly, a majority 
put their local identity before their national identity; they are Rigans and 
then Russians, or Vilnians and then Russians’.71  
 
Rose points to an important aspect of the rootedness of the Russian 
diasporians: Rather than having a state or a country as its focus, it may be 
directed towards a very specific community, town, or city. The Russian word 
for motherland -- rodina -- may also be translated as ‘the place where I was 
born’, or ‘my home district’. (Sometimes the latter is referred to as ‘the 
small rodina’ in contrast to ‘the big Rodina’, the state or the country.) 
Identification with a particular city or town in one of the non-Russian 
successor states does not by itself imply that the person identifies politically 
with the country in which this city is located. Even for a Russian who is 
intensely conscious of being a Narvian or a Crimean, the Big Rodina may 
still be the Russian Empire.  
                                           
69 A. Feoktistov, Russkie, kazakhi i Altai (Ust-Kamenogorsk: Alfa i Omega, 1992), 40. Emphasis in the 
original. 
70 Irina Malkova from the Giller Institute. Irina Malkova, ‘Analiticheskii otchet po rezul’tatam 
issledovaniia na temu "Osobennosti natsional’nogo stroitel’stva i problemy sozdaniia edinogo gosudarstva 
v bikul’turnykh obshchestvakh"‘ (Almaty: Institut Gillera, 1996), 10.  
71 Richard Rose, ‘Rights and Obligations of Individuals in the Baltic States’, East European Constitutional 
Review, Winter (1997), 35--43, p. 40.  
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The future trajectories of the political allegiances of the Russian diasporians 
will to a large degree be influenced by the actions and attitudes of the titular 
group and the state authorities in their country of residence. Integration is a 
two-way affair,72 and if the non-titulars conclude that their integrative 
endeavours are not being reciprocated, a strong feeling of local attachment 
may galvanise them into determined opposition against a nationalising 
regime that refuses to accept them as full-fledged members of the ‘nation’. 
This can give rise to secessionism as has occurred with respect to the 
Dniester republic in Eastern Moldova.73 An official memorial book 
commemorating the more than four-hundred victims on the Dniestria side in 
the Moldovan civil war in 1992 explained the outbreak of the war thus: The 
inhabitants of Moldova had been inhumanely divided into two categories: 
the Moldovans, who were regarded as the korennoi population, the ‘masters 
of the land’, versus the ‘newcomers’, the ‘migrants’, and ‘occupants’. While 
most Western observers tend to describe the Russian population in the 
Dniester as late arrivals, they themselves insist that they live on ‘ancient 
Slavic land’.74 
 
In 1996--1998 I led a research team which conducted large-scale surveys in 
Latvia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Moldova.75 In one question we asked, 
‘Which country do you regard as your homeland?’ In Kazakhstan, 35 per 
cent of the Russians answered ‘USSR’, 10 per cent ‘the Kazakh SSR’, and 
40 per cent ‘Kazakhstan’. Remarkably, only 13 per cent ticked off for 
‘Russia’. In Latvia, support for the Russia option was even lower: 11.4 per 
                                           
72 For a brilliant theoretical treatment of integration processes from this perspective, see R. A. 
Schermerhorn, Comparative ethnic relations: a framework for theory and research (New York: Random 
House, 1970), 63--84. 
73 Pål Kolstø and Andrei Malgin, ‘The Transnistrian Republic: A case of politicized Regionalism’, 
Nationalities papers 26, no. 1 (1998), 103--128. 
74 Kniga pamiati zashchitnikov Pridnestrov’ia (Tiraspol: no publisher given, 1995), 16 and 20. 
75 The surveys included 1000 respondents in each country. The survey in Kazakhstan was organised by the 
Giller Institute between May and October 1996 on 53 different locations in 10 oblasts. The Latvian survey 
was conducted by the Laboratory of Sociological Research at the Daugavpils Pedagogical University in 
September 1997 in all five administrative regions of Latvia. A full report of these survey results can be 
found in Irina Malkova, Pål Kolstø, and Hans O. Melberg, ‘Attitudinal and Linguistic Integration in 
Kazakstan and Latvia’, in Kolstø, Nation-building and ethnic integration, 227--280.  
 
The Estonian survey was organised by SaarPoll and the Moldovan survey by ‘Moldova Moderna’, again 
with 1000 respondents in each country. The data from these two countries are still in the process of being 
analysed. In all surveys the respondents were free to chose whatever ethnic identity they wanted. Those 
who indicated a dual identity (ranging from 5 to 8 percent in the various surveys), were grouped together 
with the nationality they indicated as their identity of first choice. 
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cent, while nostalgia for the defunct USSR was significantly low: 18 per 
cent.76 41 per cent claimed that ‘Latvia’ was their homeland.  
 
At the same time, the political allegiance of Russians in Kazakhstan seems to 
have been moving away from this new state over the last years. True, 5 per 
cent of the Russian respondents in our survey indicated that they had earlier 
been opposed to the establishment of an independent Kazakhstani state but 
were now in favour of it, but 12 per cent confided that they had previously 
supported Kazakhstani statehood, and had later turned against it.77 
 
In Moldova the attachment of Russians to Russia was just as low as in 
Kazakhstan: 13 per cent. Only 12 per cent of the Russians in Moldova 
claimed that they had supported independent Moldovan statehood from the 
very beginning, whereas no less than 42 per cent reported that they had 
rejected it all along.  
 
The strongest attachment to Russian we found among Russians in Estonia: 
27 per cent claimed that Russia was their homeland. This could perhaps be 
seen as an indication of a low degree of local territoriality for Russians in 
Estonia; indeed, 55 per cent of them reported that they were born outside the 
country. However, as pointed out above, cultural and political identities may 
develop in different directions, and in political terms Russians in Estonia, 
somewhat surprisingly, seem to identify more with their country of residence 
than any other Russian diaspora group in our sample: 41.5 per cent claimed 
that they had always supported Estonian independence, while another 15 per 
cent has switched from hostility earlier to support now. Only 23 per cent are 
opposed to Estonian independence today. Significantly, even among those 
who said that Russia is their homeland, 34 per cent claim that they have  
always supported Estonian independence. 
 
In Latvia, more than 100,000 Russophones who have become eligible for 
Latvian citizenship after 1995 have failed to apply for one. While the 
reasons for this lapse remain obscure, and may stem from many different 
causes, one of them is clearly the lack of identification with the Latvian 
Republic. Many local Russians are strongly attached to Latvia as a country 
and territory, but for all that they do not identify with the Latvian state. This 
is perhaps unsurprising as the political authorities in Latvia are emitting 
                                           
76 Malkova, Kolstø, and Melberg, ibid., 239. 
77 Malkova, ‘Analiticheskii otchet’, 72. 
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rather unambiguous signals to the effect that they are not intending to invite 
them into the fold of the Latvian nation. So they naturally decline 
membership of a club that does not want to have them as members. 
However, this explanation may be  difficult to reconcile with the results 
from our Estonian survey which showed that local Russians seem to identify 
not only with Estonia as a country but also as an independent state, in spite 
of the exclusionary policies pursued by the Estonian government towards 
them.  
 
 
 
Territoriality and perceptions 
The quality of territoriality cannot be divorced from quantifiable factors 
such as duration of residence, compactness and size of settlements, etc. 
However, ultimately it is a matter of perceptions. You don’t have roots in a 
region if you yourself don’t feel that you do. A person will acquire such a 
sense of attachment only when and to the degree that s/he sees this identity 
as more advantageous than the alternatives. As long as, and to the degree 
that the members of the Russian communities in the non-Russian Soviet 
successor states believe that they can benefit from playing ‘the Russian 
card’, perceiving themselves as Russians not only in the cultural and ethnic 
sense, but also in some political or territorial sense, most of them will 
continue to do so. However, the day when this option loses its appeal, the 
local Russians will start to look for other ways and means to secure their 
political representation, to get a fair share of prestigious jobs in the 
community, prop up the status of the Russian language, and protect Russian 
educational institutions. The fact that Russia for all practical purposes has 
failed to live up to its pledge to support the Russian diaspora communities 
financially may in the long run prove to be more momentous than the 
sometimes high-pitched Russian rhetoric in their defence.  
  
However, I will argue that self-perception is not enough. In order for a self-
perceived identity to hold, it must be also accepted by other interested 
parties, by the ‘external national homeland’ and the ‘new nationalizing 
state’, to use Roger Brubaker’s terminology.78 The Ossetians in Southern 
Ossetia certainly regard themselves as natives of the region they inhabit in 
Northern Georgia, having lived there for more than two hundred years. This 
claim, however, is generally repudiated by ethnic Georgians who insists that 
                                           
78 Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed. 
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the territoriality of the Ossetians is in Northern Ossetia on the other side of 
the mountain range, whence they migrated in the eighteenth century.79 The 
issue is politically highly contentious and provides part of the explanation 
for the civil war which broke out in the region in 1992.  
 
The Russians in the former Soviet republics will never reach a status as an 
‘autochthonous population’, either in their own eyes, or in the eyes of others. 
Such a claim is simply not credible and is not one of the available options. 
But between the positions of ‘autochthonous’ and ‘diaspora’ there is not an 
empty space but a continuum, and the Russians may gradually move from 
the diaspora end of the spectrum towards the centre. There we find the rather 
amorphous category of ‘national minority’.  
 
‘National minorities’ do have certain specific rights under international law, 
most recently spelled out in the Council of Europe Framework Convention 
in 1995.80 The main problem with this term from a legal point of view is that 
no legally binding documents define the groups that fall under the category. 
From an identity point of view, however, this undefined quality may provide 
for flexibility and elasticity: Those groups that regard themselves as national 
minorities, it can be argued, may be regarded as such.  
 
However, as the attentive reader may have noticed, in several of the 
statements quoted above, by Russians and non-Russians alike, the status of 
‘national minority’ for the Russians in the former Soviet republics is 
explicitly rejected. Part of the explanation for this seems to be the legacy of 
Soviet ideology in which the notion of a ‘national minority’ had a bad ring. 
This was allegedly something one would find in capitalist countries only: in 
the Soviet Union all citizens were equal; identifying majorities and 
minorities was immaterial. This perception lingers on today in some of the 
new states. In our survey in Kazakhstan, less than 10 per cent agreed that 
they belonged to a minority, in Moldova, 29 per cent.81 In the Baltics, 
however, the process of ‘minoritisation’ seems to have progressed further: in 
                                           
79 Viktor Shnirelman, ‘National identity and myths in Transcaucasia’, in Graham Smith, Vivien Law, 
Andrew Wilson, Annette Bohr, and Edward Allworth, Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The 
politics of National Identities (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1998), 48-66, on 59-64.  
80 Framework convention for the protection of national minorities and explanatory report (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, February 1995).  
81 30 percent of the respondents in Kazakhstan insisted that ‘there are no national minorities in 
Kazakhstan’. 
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Latvia more than a third of the Russians were ready accept this self-
designation, in Estonia 48 per cent.82  
 
To some extent the territorialisation of the Russian diaspora groups is a 
matter of time: those who leave the non-Russian successor states for Russia 
indirectly contribute to the territorialisation of those who stay behind. Those 
who leave first are usually those who arrived last and feel least attachment to 
the region. As the years pass those who remain will feel that their roots grow 
deeper, if for no other reason than that their loved ones are buried in local 
soil. 
 
 
 
82 Malkova, Kolstø and Melberg, ‘Attitudinal and Linguistic Integration’, 228--232. 
